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Meeting Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care: 
Some Basic Criteria 
William E. May 
The author, who is the book review editor for Linacre Quarterly, is 
a faculty member in the department of theology at the Catholic Uni-
versity of America. 
In their efforts to care for the sick and the dying and to protect and 
improve the health of the public, those engaged in the medical, nurs-
ing, and allied professions have traditionally been greatly concerned 
with moral questions. Nurses and doctors certainly want to apply 
professional expertise to the treatment of diseases and cases, but in 
addition, they want to respond to the needs of their patient-persons. 
They are, moreover, not mechanical robots but sensitive, conscien-
tious, and responsible persons. As such, they want to do what is right 
and good and not merely what is professionally competent and tech-
nically efficient. 
The problem they - and all of us - face is to determine just what is 
really right and good. There are times when this determination is 
exceedingly difficult. An ethical or moral dilemma arises when there 
are apparently good reasons for different and, at times, contradictory 
courses of action, when one is perplexed about what one ought or 
ought not to do. 1 The development of new medical technologies, 
made possible by the marvelous achievements of contemporary bio-
medical science, has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in prob-
lematic or dilemmatic situations for health care personnel. Should this 
newborn child, suffering from spina bifida, be treated immediately or 
not? Ought we to continue intravenous feedings and the use of the 
heart-lung machine for this aged comatose patient, or would it be 
morally right to discontinue such treatment? Is it right to do an 
amniocentesis to discover whether this fetus is afflicted with Tay-
Sachs disease and, if so, to abort it so that it will not suffer and its 
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parents and others will not be burdened psychologically and econ-
omically with its care? The list could continue indefinitely. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer some criteria or principles for 
making good moral judgments and choices. On this matter there is, of 
course, intense debate and over it there are serious disagreements. 
Before presenting a normative ethical theory that in my judgment is 
true and genuinely liberating, it may be helpful first to comment 
briefly on the subject of freedom and objective truth in matters moral 
and then to consider a type of normative theory quite popular in 
contemporary American culture and to show why I consider it erron-
eous. 
Freedom, Moral Objectivity, and Subjectivism 
Precisely because it is, at times, so difficult to determine what one 
ought or ought not to do and because sincere, reasonable people fre-
quently disagree, and seriously, over judgments of right and wrong, 
some conclude that it is impossible to determine whose judgments are 
true or whose are false. 2 Some who reach this conclusion believe that 
moral judgments are more similar to expressions of personal feelings 
or emotions than they are to statements having an objective content 
that can be known. Others who agree with this conclusion may not 
believe that moral judgments are emotional utterances, but they none-
theless consider them to be devoid of objective truth. They rightly 
regard morality as something entailing free personal decisions. After 
all, no one likes someone else to impose his or her values on oneself, 
and each of us experiences freedom in making moral decisions. At 
times this freedom is a terrible and awesome reality, but it is a reality 
nonetheless, and one that most of us value. They fear that if there is 
an objective truth in moral judgments or norms, then freedom to 
make one's own decisions is excluded. 
People who take these positions on moral questions are subjectiv-
ists, because they deny that there are any objective moral norms that 
can be truthfully known and affirm that ultimately moral jUdgments 
must be analyzed in terms of freely chosen values or personal inclina-
tions. Although I believe that subjectivism in morality is erroneous, 
there is a truth to which those who hold these positions point and it 
should be recognized even if subjectivism must be rejected. 
There is no doubt that we are emotionally affected by moral issues 
in ways that nonmoral issues do not affect us. Moral arguments are 
frequently charged with emotion, even passion, and there is a reason 
for this. In choosing what we are to do or not do we are determining 
our lives and shaping ourselves, giving to ourselves a moral identity, 
and in making these choices we are also, to a considerable extent, 
letting others know what kind of persons we are and what kind of 
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society we want to live in and hand over to our children. In making 
moral judgments and choices we are, as it were, making or breaking 
our lives, so that it is by no means remarkable that such judgments 
and choices should engage us wholly and emotionally as well as intel-
lectually. 
Still this does not compel us to the conclusion that moral judg-
ments are simply emotional utterances. We are capable of analyzing 
our feelings and emotions intelligently and of asking ourselves whether 
we ought to feel the way we do about the things we do and approve 
others doing. Our emotional reactions do not determine whether the 
actions we judge right are really so or not, and we ourselves frequently 
acknowledge that our judgments have been colored or swayed by our 
emotions. More importantly, we sometimes conclude that we are obli-
gated to act in ways that we find emotionally distasteful and upsetting 
and that we ought not to act in ways emotionally appealing to us. This 
quite common human experience would be utterly inexplicable were 
emotiveness the correct view of moral matters. 
Those who fear that moral freedom and responsibility would be 
destroyed were there to be objectively true moral norms, properly 
stress the goodness and value of human freedom, but they actually 
undermine a respect for human freedom by their insistence that all 
moral norms and judgments are subjective. They value freedom, and in 
my judgment, rightly so. But there are many who do not value free-
dom and who believe that it is perfectly permissible morally to impose 
views on others. Here we have two contradictory moral positions. On 
the subjectivist hypothesis, neither is really, objectively true. Those 
who value freedom and the toleration of dissenting opinions might 
seek to persuade others to accept these values, but they could point to 
no objective norms, to claims transcending personal preference, to 
support their view. 3 
It has been suggested, and properly so in my judgment, that the 
appeal to freedom to support a subjectivistic position in morality, 
while well intentioned, rests upon a failure to distinguish carefully two 
elements in moral decisions. A moral decision includes both a judg-
ment of what one is to do and a choice to do what one judges one 
ought to do. Decision as judgment has an objectivity as an expression 
of moral truth that decision as choice cannot have.4 
In making moral judgments - and this is what normative ethics or 
the attempt to provide criteria or principles for making morally good 
decisions is all about - we are not simply expressing our own personal 
preferences or private attitudes. We are affirming or denying that a 
particular course of action is objectively good or bad, right or wrong, 
and we stand ready to provide evidence and arguments to support 
these judgments and to convince others of their truth. We can, of 
course, be mistaken in our judgments, but we will be able to rectify 
them if others can show us why they are erroneous. We would not be 
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ready to change them simply on someone's assertion that they are 
emotionally distasteful or incompatible with his or her set of values. 
There would be no rational possibility of correcting our judgments, if 
they are false, were there no objectively true criteria or principles or 
norms in terms of which the errors in our judgments could be made 
known to us. Our judgments, unlike our private emotions and per-
sonal preferences and even our free choices, are amenable to public 
scrutiny and discussion. We can argue intelligently over them, and, as 
Thomas Gilby has remarked, "civilization is formed by men locked in 
argument."5 Subjectivism in morality actually erodes civilization, for 
all it leads to is bitter quarrelling that is eventually settled by superior 
might, legislative fiat, or judicial decree. 6 
Decision as choice, as the expression of our own freedom to deter-
mine our own lives, lacks the objectivity that decision as judgment 
possesses. We may not, as experience sadly testifies, always choose to 
act in accord with our own best judgments about what we are to do. 
We are free to violate our own conscience; we are free to sin. We can, 
of course, come to repent wicked choices knowingly made, and a 
better understanding of why those choices were wicked may be of 
help, but only God's grace can effectively change our hearts and lead 
us to amend our ways. 
The position adopted here, that moral norms can be objectively 
true, in no way entails intolerance for the liberty and views of others. 
We can respect the freedom of choice of those with whom we disagree 
in moral judgments. We may argue, and rightly so, that their judg-
ments are mistaken, but we do not necessarily hold that they are the 
result of either stupidity or viciousness. At times we may even, for the 
sake of the good of personal liberty, judge that some forms of overt 
behavior which we personally judge to be morally wrong, can and 
perhaps ought to be tolerated by society. Nor are we necessarily intol-
erant and enemies of the good of personal liberty when we judge that 
there are some sorts or kinds of behavior which simply cannot be 
tolerated in a just society. A person, for example, who holds that no 
one should ever be permitted to use children as subjects of hard core 
pornographic plays and films is not necessarily an intolerant, insensi-
tive, ruthless fanatic bent on imposing his will tyrannically on others. 
Similarly, I would argue (although this is not the place to do so) that 
the effort to extend the equal protection of law to those members of 
the human species who are living, yet unborn, is by no means inimical 
to the values of liberty and justice for alP 
With these preliminary observations on freedom and moral objec-
tivity in mind, I propose now to turn to the subject of normative 
ethics. I shall first present and criticize a type of normative ethics 
widely popular in our culture, then propose and defend a much differ-
ent sort, one that is, in my opinion, true and therefore genuinely 
liberating. 
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Consequentialism 
A type of normative ethics or moral methodology advocated by 
many in America today is consequentialism.8 There are many types of 
consequentialism. Soine versions, in particular utilitarianism and the 
situation ethics proposed by Joseph Fletcher, are purely consequen-
tial. They claim that all moral norms and values are grounded in 
consequentialist considerations alone. 9 Other forms of consequential-
ism, including the "proportionate good" or "proportionate reason" 
approach articulated by several prominent Roman Catholic moral 
theologians,1O are variously called "mixed" or "mediating" conse-
quentialistic approaches. 11 These versions hold that some, or even all 
moral norms and values, can be established only if consequentialistic 
considerations are fittingly supplemented by nonconsequentialistic 
ones. 12 
Despite differences, and at times these are very great, in different 
forms of consequentialistic normative theories, all agree in claiming 
that the proper way to arrive at a good moral judgment in problematic 
or dilemmatic situations is to assess the consequences of the various 
alternatives and then choose that alternative which promises to bring 
about the greatest good, even if the "greatest good" in some cases is 
simply the "lesser eviL" 13 As one advocate of consequentialism puts 
it, 
How do we discover the right thing to do? We discover it by balancing the 
various "goods" and "bads" that are part of the situation and by trying to 
achieve the greatest proportion of goods to bads. What constitutes right 
action? It is that action which contains the proportionally greatest maxim· 
ization of good and minimization of evil. 14 
All versions of consequentialism likewise agree in holding that there 
are no kinds of human behavior, describable in nonmoral terms, which 
are always immoral. 15 A consequentialist would grant that "murder is 
always wrong," because by definition murder means an "unjust 
killing." But the consequentialist would then argue that in order to 
determine whether the killing is unjust or not, one must discover 
whether or not there is some achievable good that can justify it. Thus 
the consequentialist would deny that it is always wrong deliberately , 
and intentionally to kill an innocent human being. It all depends on 
whether choosing this alternative will serve to maximize good or 
minimize evil. 
We can see from this that in certain kinds of ethical dilemmas faced 
by health-care personnel, for instance in cases concerning the abortion 
of unborn children afflicted by genetic disorders, the treatment of 
severely crippled newborns or the care to be given to terminally ill 
patients, the consequentialist would seek to discover what action is 
called for by evaluating the consequences and by trying to determine 
whether lethal action or, at times, benign neglect might not be the 
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morally proper course to follow. Different consequentialists would 
reach different judgments in similar cases, however, because there 
would be a disagreement among them concerning the determination of 
the "greatest good~" Thus Joseph Fletcher would have no difficulties 
in judging that an abortion is justifiable whenever the child might be 
"unwanted," 16 and he would likewise judge, on a calculus of conse-
quences, that it would be morally right to "allow" Down's syndrome 
infan~ffering from intestinal disorders to die or even actively to kill 
the~There are other consequentialists, for instance H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, who would substantively agree with these moral conclu-
sions. 18 Other consequentialists, of course, would vigorously 
repudiate judgments of this sort as erroneous and immoral. 19 
What this shows us is that different consequentialists will come to 
different normative rules and conclusions from their general principle 
that we can resolve dilemmatic situations by assessing the various 
alternative courses of action and then choose that one which will lead 
to the greater good. This in itself is a purely descriptive and factual 
consideration, but I believe that it is also a strong indication that any 
kind of consequentialistic normative moral theory is beset with 
insuperable difficulties and is thus erroneous and incapable of provi-
ding us with the criteria or principles we need if we are to cope 
humanly and intelligently with ethical dilemmas in health care or in 
any area of human life. 20 
An obvious difficulty with consequentialism is the problem of iden-
tifying the "greater good." All consequentialists will agree, for 
example, that we ought not to go about killing innocent human beings 
for no reason. They argue that there must be some "greater good" or 
"proportionate good" that such an act can serve for it to be morally 
justifiable or that there must be some terrible evil that could be 
averted by doing this sort of deed so that choosing to do it would be 
the "lesser evil." Yet they find it very difficult to determine the 
nature of the "greater good." Some, and Joseph Fletcher and act 
utilitarians in general are illustrative of these, would attempt to dis-
cover this greater good by means of a quantitative calculus. According 
to them, we discover the deed that will serve the greater good by 
counting the number of persons who will be benefitted by the deed 
and the number of those who will be harmed. If more people are 
helped than harmed by the action in question, then it is the one that 
will bring about the greater goOd. 21 The less simple and more com-
plex varieties of consequentialist thinking repudiate this quantitative 
calculus. In its stead they propose that certain kinds of human goods, 
for instance personal dignity and integrity, liberty and the ability to 
communicate, are "higher" or "greater" than such goods as physical 
life, so that the choice to destroy physical life can be morally justi-
fiable when doing so serves these higher goods of persons and com-
munities. 22 Nonetheless, they have serious difficulties in "weighing" 
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and "balancing" the various goods of persons and communities. Still 
they are operating on the assumption that it is possible, at least 
theoretically, to discover the "greater" or "proportionate" good, for 
this is the basic assumption of consequentialist thought, one required 
by its fundamental principle that we can resolve moral dilemmas by 
weighing alternative courses of action, examining their consequences 
and then choosing the alternative which promises the greatest 
maximization of good and minimization of evil. 
This fundamental assumption or presupposition of consequential-
ism is its basic weakness, one that has been noted by many writers, 
most recently in important essays by Paul Ramsey23 and Germain G. 
Grisez.24 Each of us would obviously agree with the maxim that one 
ought to choose the alternative that promises the greater good if by 
good is understood what is morally good, for the morally good choice 
is, after all, the one we are seeking to make in our endeavor to shape 
our lives responsibly. The truth of this maxim, so understood, is what 
makes consequentialism initially plausible to many people. But when 
the consequentialist proposes this as the fundamental principle for 
resolving moral dilemmas, he is not using the term good in a moral 
sense. He is referring to good in the sense that it designates some 
perfection or set of perfections contributing to the flourishing of 
human persons and communities, to good in the sense that life and 
health, liberty and justice, human dignity and friendship, knowledge 
and peace, are "good." He assumes that we can weigh or measure 
these goods, when a conflict arises, thus determining which among 
them is greater so that pursuing it is justifiable even if its pursuit 
requires us deliberately and of set purpose to destroy other goods. 25 
The difficulty, of course, is that the basic goods of the human 
person are not measurable quantities which can be compared and 
balanced off against each other in any clearly unambiguous way. They 
refer to a different dimension of our being and are simply not capable 
of being quantified and measured. 26 How, for example, is it possible 
to compare the good of knowledge pursued for its own sake with the 
good of being treated justly, being in a state of good health or being 
alive? The fact is that all of these are goods of human persons and 
contribute to human flourishing. Human beings commit themselves to 
the pursuit of these goods, and their doing so is intelligent and appro-
priate. 
Health care personnel have committed themselves to the good of 
human life and health, as lawyers and others have committed them-
selves to the good of justice, and as teachers and others have com-
mitted themselves to the good of knowledge. It would be arrogant for • 
a doctor to claim that the good of health is measurably superior to the 
good of justice or knowledge, just as it would be for lawyers to claim 
that in pursuing the good of justice they are pursuing a good measur-
ably superior to the good of health that a doctor seeks to serve or the 
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good of knowledge that others seek to pursue. Yet for consequential-
ism to be true, there must be some way to measure the goods which 
go to make up the whole human good, to compare them in such a way 
that one can clearly determine, in situations when various goods 
appeal to us in different ways, which is the "better" or "higher." The 
attempt to do so is doomed to failure, and this helps us understand 
why consequentialists disagree so sharply among themselves in the 
determination of the greater good. Because the goods of the human 
person are in truth incomparable there is no clearly unambiguous way 
to weigh and balance them off against each other. Thus consequential-
ists end up by arbitrarily asserting that one or another good is measur-
ably greater than another. 
Other objections can be raised against consequentialism as a method 
for resolving ethical dilemmas in addition to the fact that it is pred-
icated upon an attempt to measure the incommensurable and compare 
the incomparable.27 One which in my view is telling is the fact that 
consequentialism is a form of extrinsicism. By this I mean that it 
determines the rightness or wrongness of human acts by factors extrin-
sic to the acts themselves, namely by their consequences or effects. 28 
The consequentialist, in other words, seeks to determine whether a 
proposed course of human action is morally good or morally evil by 
attempting to discover what that act will get done or achieve. But as 
many authors point out, our acts not only get something done, they 
also get something said. 29 They have something to tell us about our-
selves and the kind of persons we are. They are, in other words, 
intelligible, and we can discover their meaning and intelligibility. By 
our willingness to do the deeds we do, we take on, as part of our 
moral identity, the identity of doers of certain sorts of deeds. Thus if 
we are willing to do what is in truth an act of killing a fellow human 
being, we take on, as part of our identity, the identity of killers, even 
if we seek to conceal this identity from ourselves. And, I submit, we 
ought not to be willing to take on this identity, for in giving freely to 
ourselves this kind of identity we are failing to become the beings that 
we are meant to be. 3o The consequentialist, by identifying the moral 
meaning of our acts with their results or consequences, is really engag-
ing in a form of self-deception, for the consequentialist succumbs to 
the temptation to redescribe the actions one chooses to do in terms of 
their intended consequences, so that the very nature of the act is 
ignored or kept hidden from the mind and from public scrutiny. 31 
Thus the consequentialist will redescribe the act of starving a crippled 
newborn to death as an act of beneficent euthanasia or of kindness, or 
the act of using a mentally incompetent person as the subject of an 
experiment of no possible benefit to that person as im act of scientific 
research advancing human knowledge. 
If a normative ethics or methodology predicated upon consequen-
tialistic premises is erroneous, as I hope that I have shown, then what 
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approach can be recommended? My desire now is to articulate a type · 
of normative ethics that can provide us with the principles we need in 
order to cope with ethical dilemmas, whether in health care or in any 
other area of human life, intelligently, responsibly, and morally. 
A N onconsequentialist Theory of the Human Good 
The position that I hope to articulate is rooted in the thought of 
Thomas Aquinas and in the whole Judeo-Christian tradition and is 
today developed by a number of writers, in particular by Germain 
Grisez,32 John Finnis,33 and Paul Ramsey.34 This position agrees 
with St. Paul that we ought not freely choose to do evil so that good 
may come about (cf. Romans 3.8), and with Socrates it holds that we 
ought rather to suffer injustice than to choose to do an injustice. It 
rejects, therefore, the view, irremediably present in all forms of con-
sequentialism, that the end justifies the means. 35 
. This nonconsequentialist theory begins with the principle that good 
is to be done and pursued and that evil is to be avoided. 36 This 
principle is accepted as a truth needing no demonstration and incap-
able of being demonstrated, for its truth is evident once one under-
stands what is meant by good and by evil. For good means what is 
truly perfective of a being, what any being needs if that being is to be 
what it is meant to be, and evil means the deprivation of good. This 
principle, moreover, is the starting point or beginning for all intelligent 
behavior. No matter what any of us does, whether it is morally right 
or morally wrong, we do it because we believe we are achieving some-
thing good. No one chooses evil for the sake of evil. We may choose 
what we know to be morally wicked or evil, but even in choices of this 
sort we are seeking some good, and we attempt to justify our choices 
both to ourselves and to others by appealing to some good that we 
hope to achieve through the act we choose to do. 37 
The human good, moreover, is pluriform. We have already seen this 
in our consideration of consequentialism. There are many goods of the 
human person, each contributing in its own way to the flourishing of 
human existence and human communities. Among these are the goods 
of life and health, truth, justice, peace, friendship, knowledge. 38 As 
such, these goods are nonmoral, for after all a person is not a morally 
wicked person because he or she lacks friends or is sick or is treated 
unjustly or is ignorant. Still, these goods are real goods of human 
persons and as such are worthy of human choice; we need these goods 
if we are to be fully ourselves, and we have a right to participate in 
these goods. 39 
Moral considerations arise when we relate these goods to the human 
will or, to speak biblically, to the human heart. The person whose 
heart is open to God - the morally upright person - is the one who is 
open to these real goods of human persons and to their realization, 
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both in himself and in others. None of these goods is the highest good 
(the summum bonum) or "absolute" good in the sense of being the 
be-all and end-all of human existence, for only God is the highest good 
or summum bonum. But a human person determines his or her moral 
identity, his or her moral being, by his or her attitude toward these 
real goods of human persons. Since these goods are truly goods of the 
human person, we ought to be ready to acknowledge them as such. 
They specify the sorts or kinds of good that we are to do and pursue, 
and the evils depriving us and others of them are the evils that we are 
to avoid in our actions. 4o Each of these goods (life and health, truth, 
justice, peace, friendship, knowledge, etc.) is really worthy of human 
choice because each is a good of persons, not a good for persons. 
These goods, in other words, are what older theologians and philos-
ophers called bona honesta or noble goods, because each is incom-
parably precious and priceless, because each is something intrinsically 
perfective of our being and a created participation in the goodness of 
the uncreated and supreme good, God Himself. None is a purely useful 
good (a bonum utile), something good only for something else. 
Since none of these basic human goods is the absolute, unlimited 
good, the be-all and the end-all of our existence, none ought to be 
regarded as such and made to function as the key to solving dilem-
matic situations; none, in short, is the measurably "greater" or "great-
est" good postulated by consequentialism for whose sake we are to be 
willing deliberately and of set purpose to destroy other goods of the 
human person, to close our hearts to their goodness. 41 
Although we cannot pursue all of these goods all the time, they are 
the goods that we are to do and to which we are to commit ourselves, 
and the evils destructive of them are the evils that we are to avoid. We 
may, in tragic circumstances, have to suffer their loss or destruction in 
ourselves and in others when the effort to protect them would neces-
sarily entail the choice to repudiate other real goods of human per-
sons. We may also rightly choose to do an act that is itself targeted on 
the protection of a basic good when this is being imperiled even if the 
act will foreseeably lead to the loss of some other good when there are 
no other alternatives for protecting the imperiled good and there are 
no morally compelling reasons for us to refrain from acting. 42 
Because each of these goods is really something good and hence 
worthy of human choice and love, we ought to be unwilling to set our 
wills, our hearts, our persons, against anyone of them and to say, 
effectively through our actions, that anyone of them is, here and 
now, not a good but an evil. This means that we ought to be unwilling 
to choose, deliberately and of set purpose, acts in which we propose 
to destroy any of these goods, to do evil so that good may come 
about. 
The nonconsequentialistic moral theory here proposed for your 
consideration is, in brief, one that accepts completely the truth that 
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good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. It holds that 
we are acting unreasonably ·13 when we choose to regard any real good 
of human persons as something that here and now ought to be 
destroyed of set purpose because its continued flourishing in a human 
person inhibits participation in some other human good, a good that 
we arbitrarily regard as a measurably greater good and for whose sake 
we close our hearts and person to the claims of some other real good 
of the human person. 
I should like now to illustrate this nonconsequentialistic normative 
theory by reflecting on some dilemmas in health care. According to 
the principles grounded in a recognition of and love for the basic 
goods of human persons (and of the persons in whom these goods are 
realized) there are some sorts or kinds of deeds that we ought not to 
be willing to do freely and deliberately. These are the sorts or kinds of 
deeds in which of necessity we turn against or repudiate basic human 
goods. Among these goods is the good of life itself.44 Thus, according 
to the principles of this nonconsequentialistic ethics, we ought not to 
be willing to choose to do deeds that can truthfully be described as 
acts of killing human life. We ought not, therefore, choose to kill 
unborn children because other persons do not want them or assert 
that their lives will not be meaningful. We may take action to protect 
the life of an unborn child's mother when her life is in danger of being 
lost even if we foresee that in taking this action the life of her unborn 
child will tragically be lost. In such instances our deed is not one of 
killing life but of saving life that merits protection and can be pro-
tected only by the deed we choose. In choosing this deed, we are not 
closing our hearts to the life of her unborn child, for the death of the 
unborn child is not what we are intending to bring about, although we 
realize that it will result as a nonintended and tragic concomitant of 
the saving act that we have chosen to do. 
On this nonconsequentialistic ethics, we ought not choose to kill 
newborn children or dying patients either by benign neglect or by 
taking lethal action against them; 45 if any alternative that we propose 
to ourselves in deliberating about what we are to do in caring for these 
fellow human beings includes the proposal to kill them because their 
lives, in our estimation or in that of others, are of no value, then this is 
an alternative that ought not to be chosen, for in choosing it we are 
choosing death, not life - an evil, not a good. 46 
This does not in any way mean that we may not rightly choose to 
withhold or discontinue treatment for those patient-persons, or that 
we may not rightly elect, for ourselves, not to consent to certain sorts 
of treatments. We may, in other words, allow others to die their own 
death and accept our own, and it can even be wicked to burden others 
with "treatments" that serve only to prolong their dying and are of no 
benefit to them.47 There is an enormous difference (one that many 
consequentialists endeavor mightily to reject as meaning-
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less)48 between choosing to kill someone or oneself and choosing to 
allow another to die or to accept death for oneself. 49 Moreover, we 
need to recall that we can kill someone just as efficiently by omitting 
to do what we are obliged to do as we can by taking affirmative 
action. If your baby slips in the bathtub and is submerged in water 
and you do nothing to help, you are killing your baby by your failure 
to act just as effectively as you would by strangling it. Similarly the 
mentally retarded newborn in need of an operation to correct an 
intestinal blockage is killed and not merely allowed to die when 
nothing is done and he is starved by "benign neglect." 
I believe that these reflections may help us to gain an understanding 
of what the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" care mean. They 
do not refer to standard treatment; rather they are moral, not medical, 
terms. Ordinary means obligatory care, and extraordinary means 
elective or nonobligatory care. 50 I suggest that a crucial way for dis-
tinguishing between them is to ask whether failure to employ or con-
tinue a certain means is equivalent to a proposal to kill the person in 
question. If it is, then the means is "ordinary" and morally obligatory; 
if it is not, then the means is "extraordinary" and elective and non-
obligatory . 
These comments, I hope, may have served to give an understanding 
of the vast differences between consequentialistic and nonconsequen-
tialistic theories of normative ethics and their relevance to some basic 
questions in health care. I know that many questions can and ought to 
be raised about the nonconsequentialistic theory of human goods 
proposed and commended here. Nonetheless, this theory is, in my 
judgment, one that will enable us to confront ethical dilemmas rightly 
and to become "locked in argument" should disagreements arise, with 
the possibility of settling these disagreements by an appeal to norma-
tive principles of human choice and action that are universally true. 
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